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Political uncertainty is a key determinant of investment decisions. Specifically, the uncertainty that
surrounds government policy makes beliefs noisier and depresses stock prices. In this paper, we explore
whether institutional investors “herd”, i.e., mimic each other’s trades, in response to political uncertainty.
Using U.S. institutional investors’ quarterly holding data from 1985 through 2019, we find evidence consistent
with our conjecture. We also find that the results are stronger in times of low presidential popularity, and
among companies that are politically sensitive. Overall, the findings suggest that the effect of political
uncertainty on financial markets is larger than previously thought.
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1. Introduction
Political uncertainty is a key determinant of corporate investment decisions, both from a micro and a
macro perspective (Rodrik, 1991; Hasset and Mecalf, 1999). For example, companies decrease their invest-
ment when political uncertainty is high (Julio and Yook, 2012; Jens 2017), because they find it optimal
to defer investment until uncertainty has been resolved (see, e.g., Bernanke, 1983; Bloom, Bond, and Van
Reenen, 2007). The uncertainty that surrounds government policy also affects investor beliefs (Pástor and
Veronesi, 2012, 2013), commands a risk premium (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Brogaard and Detzel, 2015;
Kelly, Pástor, and Veronesi, 2016), and increases volatility in international financial markets (Boutchkova,
Doshi, Durnev, and Molchanov, 2012). In light of these pervasive real and financial effects, political uncer-
tainty plays an important role in the economy at large.
In this paper, we explore whether political uncertainty also affects trading behavior. Specifically, we
analyze whether institutional investors “herd”, i.e., mimic each other’s trades, in response to political uncer-
tainty. Our conjecture builds on two well-known mechanisms. First, noisier signals constitute an incentive
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for institutional investors to herd more (Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004).1 Second, institutional investors face
reputational and litigation costs when their behavior deviates from the herd (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990;
Trueman, 1994), particularly in the presence of negative stock information, as the latter increases the chance
of realizing losses (Brown, Wei, and Wermers, 2014).2 Since political uncertainty makes investor beliefs
noisier and depresses stock prices (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013), we expect both motivating mechanisms of
herding to be operational during politically uncertain times.
Using U.S. institutional investors’ quarterly holding data from 1985 through 2019, we find evidence
consistent with our conjecture. We find a positive and large association between stock-level institutional
herding and political uncertainty, controlling for a number of financial, economic, and political indicators.
For brevity, we denote this relation as “politically-motivated herding”. We also find that the estimates are
of higher magnitude in times of low presidential popularity, which supports the view that unpopular admin-
istrations have a proclivity for riskier policies as a form of gambling for resurrection (see, e.g., Downs and
Rocke, 1994; Pástor and Veronesi, 2013).
Consistent with the idea that institutional herding partly reflects similar investment styles (Choi and
Sias, 2009; Celiker, Chowdhury, and Sonaer, 2015), we also identify a number of stock-level patterns. We
find that politically-motivated herding is significantly stronger for riskier stocks, defined as those charac-
terized by small market capitalization and weak political connections. We also find that such herding is
more pronounced for politically-sensitive stocks, but only under Republican presidencies, which supports
the extant evidence that these administrations are characterized by higher risk (Blinder and Watson, 2016;
Pástor and Veronesi, 2018).
Political uncertainty’s impact over the propensity of fund managers to herd is largely fueled by established
herding drivers. Investment professionals herd intentionally as a response to uncertainty in the marketplace.
This uncertainty is often of an informational nature (Devenow and Welch, 1996). When the information
signals available are noisy, fund managers may choose to mimic the trades of their peers (either because their
processing skills are inadequate or because their peers are better-informed). In the process, they sideline
their private signals and give rise to informational cascades (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch, 1992).
Alternatively, this uncertainty may bear a professional connotation. In view of the periodic performance
evaluation of investment professionals, low-quality fund managers may resort to tracking the trades of their
high-quality peers in order to emit an image of competence and safeguard their career prospects (Scharfstein
and Stein, 1990; Jiang and Verardo, 2018). This is expected to be more so in the presence of negative
news’ arrival, since this is associated with a greater potential for losses – and for reputational/litigation risk
1For more on how informational ambiguity can motivate herding, see the analytical studies by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), and the herding review by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003).
2For example, bank trust departments engage in herd behavior to defend the prudence of their investments, thus minimizing
litigation risk (Sias, 2004).
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(Brown, Wei, and Wermers, 2014).3
In this paper, we explore politics as a source of uncertainty that can motivate herding on behalf of fund
managers. Pástor and Veronesi (2012) identify two types of political uncertainty that affect investor be-
havior. These are the uncertainty about whether the current government policy will change, and about the
impact that government policy will have on the profitability of the private sector. The overall effect of these
two types of uncertainty is to make beliefs noisier, and depress asset prices (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013). As
a result, we expect fund managers to herd more in times of high political uncertainty, in an attempt to infer
information from each other’s trades and avoid holding losing stocks.
To estimate institutional herding at the stock-level, we follow the methodology from Sias (2004). Using
U.S. 13F institutional investors’ holding data, we calculate each institutional investor’s end-of-quarter posi-
tion in each security as a fraction of the security’s shares outstanding. For each quarter, we then calculate
(and standardize) the fraction of institutional investors that are net buyers of any given stock, and regress
it on the fraction from the previous quarter. We then partition this first-order autocorrelation of institu-
tional demand into the genuine herding component and the part due to institutions following their own past
trades. We respectively consider stocks with at least 1, 5, 10, and 20 institutional traders, which generates
four herding measures overall.
As in Pástor and Veronesi (2013), we primarily proxy political uncertainty with the U.S. economic policy
uncertainty index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). The index is based on three components: cover-
age of policy-related economic uncertainty on ten U.S. major newspapers, the number of federal tax code
provisions set to expire in future years, and disagreement among economic forecasters. As such, this index
captures the two aforementioned types of political uncertainty from Pástor and Veronesi (2012). For robust-
ness, we also consider an alternative version of the index that is exclusively news-based, and taps into over
1,000 U.S. newspaper archives from Access World News’ NewsBank service.
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we find a strong and positive association between stock-level
institutional herding and political uncertainty. To get a sense of the magnitude, we find that a one-standard-
deviation increase in either specification of the economic policy uncertainty index is associated with an
increase between one-fifth and one-third of a standard deviation in institutional herding within the same
quarter. The estimates are robust accounting for a number of financial, political, and economic controls, such
as the level and volatility of stock returns, presidential term-years and political affiliation, the rate of growth
of consumption, industrial production, and employment, and the NBER recession indicator. Overall, our
results seem to be driven by genuine political uncertainty, rather than uncertainty of a financial or economic
nature.4
3Intent aside, fund managers may also exhibit correlation in their trades without imitation mediating the process (“spurious
herding”); the latter may hold when they follow similar investment styles (Celiker, Chowdhury, and Sonaer, 2015; Frijns,
Gilbert, and Zwinkels, 2016), or when their information sets are correlated (“investigative herding” – see Froot, Scharfstein,
and Stein, 1992 and Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman, 1994).
4It is important to note that these types of uncertainty are all related to some extent (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Baker,
Bloom, and Davis, 2016). In our sample, for instance, we find that both versions of the index of economic policy uncertainty are
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Pástor and Veronesi (2013) show that government has an incentive to look for reform when the current
policy does not yield the expected results, which increases uncertainty about its future actions. Specifically,
new potential policies are likely to be riskier when popularity falls below a given threshold, because the
contract between the executive and the constituency makes it optimal to engage in some form of gambling
for resurrection (see Downs and Rocke (1994) for an excellent discussion). In light of these considerations,
we expect the relation between political uncertainty and institutional herding to be particularly strong in
times of low political sentiment.
To test this hypothesis, we acknowledge that the difference between approval and disapproval ratings
represents a key measure of popularity of the U.S. president (Abramowitz, 2004, 2008). When net disap-
proval is high, the group of presidential opponents becomes relatively large vis-à-vis the supporters’ group.
In turn, this implies that the overall level of political sentiment in the country is low. Consistent with our
conjecture, we find that the relation between institutional herding and political uncertainty is significantly
stronger in times of large net disapproval.
To validate the results, we test two specific implications of our story. First, a high degree of economic
policy uncertainty also makes government policies harder to assess, making evaluations more dispersed (see,
e.g., Bloom, 2014). As a result, we should find a similar association between institutional herding and differ-
ences of opinion over government economic policy. Second, policies that are harder to evaluate should also
make economic outcomes less predictable. In turn, this implies a relation between institutional herding and
differences of opinion over future business conditions. Using data from the Thomson Reuters/University of
Michigan Surveys of Consumers, we find evidence consistent with both predictions.
Around the mid-1990s, a large increase in the market share of equity funds created a structural shift in
mutual-fund herding. Before then, mutual-fund herding was limited, and associated with an improvement
in market efficiency (Wermers, 1999). Afterwards, institutional herding increased substantially, and became
destabilizing for stock prices (Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo, 2011; Brown, Wei, and Wermers, 2014). Con-
sistent with this pattern, we find that the effect of economic policy uncertainty on institutional herding is
concentrated in the latter period. We also find that politically-motivated herding is stronger after negative
shocks to aggregate mutual-fund growth, which sheds new light on the idea that reputational and career con-
cerns play an important role in institutional herding (see, e.g., Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo, 2011; Brown,
Wei, and Wermers, 2014).
In the last part of the paper, we study the effect of political uncertainty on institutional herding within a
few specific stock categories. In the first group of tests, we consider company size. It is well-known that small
stocks are riskier (in information and liquidity terms) than large stocks, and thus command a risk premium
(see, e.g., Fama and French, 1992, 1993). The higher risk that characterizes these stocks, however, should
also make them more sensitive to political uncertainty, and thus more likely to attract politically-motivated
positively correlated with stock market volatility (both realized and implied), and negatively correlated with macroeconomic
indicators. However, politically-motivated herding is not explained away by any of these variables.
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herding.5 The empirical evidence supports this conjecture. We find that the relation between institutional
herding and economic policy uncertainty is significantly stronger for small stocks, and especially so in times
of low political sentiment.
Next, we study the effect of political connections on politically-motivated herding. In the spirit of Bona-
parte, Kumar, and Page (2017), we classify companies as “connected” if they are located in states aligned
with the political affiliation of the White House, and “unconnected” otherwise. The intuition is that a state
governor who is from the same political party as the president may grant local companies (directly or indi-
rectly) preferential access to the office of the presidency, with potential advantages ranging from information
acquisition to favorable policy-making.6
Since less politically-connected firms have more uncertain prospects (see, e.g., Fisman, 2001; Faccio,
Masulis, and McConnell, 2006), we hypothesize that connected companies have a political edge over un-
connected companies, other things being equal. Specifically, the latter can be thought of as comparatively
riskier. Consistent with this view, we find that the relation between institutional herding and economic pol-
icy uncertainty is significantly stronger for unconnected companies. When the president becomes unpopular,
however, the relation flips sign, which suggests that companies are negatively affected by a political connec-
tion to an unpopular president. This result provides new evidence for the idea that politically-connected
firms suffer disproportionately more from negative shocks to the incumbent government (see, e.g., Fisman,
2001).
Pástor and Veronesi (2018) propose a theoretical model of political cycles, and show that Republican
presidential candidates are picked when electors prefer less insurance and more business risk. Consistent
with this view, Blinder and Watson (2016) find an empirical association between Republican administrations
and a number of particularly tough and controversial issues in the postwar era.7 Drawing on these insights,
we hypothesize that a given level of economic policy uncertainty is associated with greater risk under Re-
publican administrations, and therefore with more institutional herding.
To test this hypothesis, we identify specific stock categories that are more sensitive to the political af-
filiation of the presidency. We consider small stocks (Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003), stocks with high
firm-level political risk (Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun, 2019), and stocks deemed as “politically
sensitive” (Hong and Kostovetsky, 2012). The empirical evidence lends support to our conjecture. We find
that the relation between institutional herding and economic policy uncertainty is stronger for these stocks,
and the effect is concentrated under Republican administrations.
The present work speaks to a burgeoning literature on politics and finance. A growing body of evidence
shows that political evaluations affect risk taking (Bonaparte, Kumar, and Page, 2017; Meeuwis, Parker,
5While institutional investors generally exhibit a preference for large stocks, there is a substantial fraction of mutual funds
that trades small stocks (Falkenstein, 1996).
6This is the reason we consider the political color of the state, rather than the county, because this mechanism is unlikely
to be operational for lower-level political representatives.
7The list includes adverse oil shocks, lower total factor productivity performance, a generally less favorable international
environment, lower consumer optimism, and an overall less predictable economy.
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Schoar, and Simester, 2018), analysts’ forecasts (Kempf and Tsoutsoura, 2018), asset allocation (Hong and
Kostovetsky, 2012; Addoum and Kumar, 2016), and stock returns (Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2003). In
this paper, we find that political evaluations also generate institutional herd behavior. To the extent that
herding can destabilize stock prices (Dasgupta, Prat, Verardo, 2011; Brown, Wei, and Wermers, 2014), the
results suggest that the effect of political uncertainty on financial markets might be larger than previously
thought.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology. Section 3 illustrates the
empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2. Data and methodology
Institutional herding
The main dependent variable of our study is stock-level institutional herding. To identify it empirically,
we use U.S. 13F institutional ownership quarterly data and follow the methodology from Sias (2004).8
The sample period is from the first quarter of 1985 through the fourth quarter of 2019. We calculate
each institutional investor’s end-of-quarter position in each security as a fraction of the security’s shares
outstanding. For each security and quarter, we define buyers as institutional investors who increased their
ownership in the stock quarter-on-quarter, and sellers otherwise.
Following Sias (2004), we apply a number of filters. We only include common stocks, and managers that
hold at least one security at both the beginning and at the end of the quarter. Also, we limit the sample to
securities that have the same CUSIP throughout the quarter, and at least one institutional investor trading
the security during the quarter. We further divide stocks into securities held by at least 1, 5, 10, or 20
institutional traders.
For each quarter, we calculate the fraction of institutional investors that are net buyers of security k in
quarter t:
Raw∆k,t =
No. of institutions buyingk,t
No. of institutions buyingk,t + No. of institutions sellingk,t
. (1)
To allow for aggregation over time and comparisons across specifications, we standardize this ratio. Specif-
ically, we subtract the cross-sectional average fraction of net buyers in quarter t from the raw ratio for a
given stock in the same quarter, and divide by the cross-sectional standard deviation (across securities) of





To identify institutional herding, we estimate a regression of the standardized fraction of institutions buying
security k in quarter t over the fraction from the previous quarter:
∆k,t = βt∆k,t−1 + εk,t, (3)
8Sias (2004) uses the Spectrum database, which reports holdings at the institutional level. By contrast, our data set reports
holdings at the mutual fund level.
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where ∆k,t is the standardized fraction of institutions buying security k in the current quarter (t), and βt
measures institutional demand’s cross-sectional correlation between the current quarter (t) and the previous
one (t− 1). We expect βt > 0 for two reasons. First, institutional investors may follow their own trades over
time, i.e., continue trading in the same direction. Second, and importantly for our purposes, such investors
may follow each other into and out of the same securities (herding). To tease out the latter mechanism from
































where Nk,t is the number of active funds trading security k on quarter t; Nk,t−1 is the number of active funds
trading security k on quarter t−1; Dn,k,t is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if fund n increases
its position in security k on quarter t, and zero if fund n increases its position in security k; Dm,k,t−1 is a
dummy variable that takes the value of one if fund m (m 6= n) increases its position in security k in quarter
t − 1, and zero when its position decreases. The first term on the right-hand side of the equation above
represents the portion of institutional demand due to funds following the own trades, while the second term
represents the portion of institutional demand due to funds following the trades of others. A positive value
of the second term would indicate that funds trade towards the trades of other funds in quarter t (herding),
while a negative value indicate that funds trade away from other funds.
In Table 1, Panel A, we provide time-series averages of the institutional herding estimates. We find that
herding is positive and significant for all four thresholds of active funds per stock we consider. Specifically,
stocks with at least 1, 5, 10, or 20 institutional traders respectively exhibit a herding coefficient of 0.11, 0.28,
0.35, and 0.40 (p-value < 0.01 for all four, computed from the time-series standard errors), thus revealing
that the magnitude of herding increases with the number of institutional traders active in a stock. The
magnitude increases with the number of institutional traders, as these are stocks that are more popular for
example for common investment styles.
Political uncertainty
To empirically identify political uncertainty, we use the U.S. economic policy uncertainty index from
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). The main version of the index has three components. The first component
is an index of search results from 10 large newspapers. The newspapers included are USA Today, the Miami
Herald, the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Boston Globe, the San
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Francisco Chronicle, the Dallas Morning News, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal. From
these papers, the authors construct a normalized index of the volume of news articles discussing economic
policy uncertainty.
The second component draws on reports by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that compile lists
of temporary federal tax-code provisions. The authors create annual dollar-weighted numbers of tax-code
provisions scheduled to expire over the next 10 years, giving a measure of the level of uncertainty regarding
the path that the federal tax code will take in the future.
The third and last component draws on the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional
Forecasters. Specifically, the authors utilize the dispersion between individual forecasters’ predictions about
future levels of the Consumer Price Index, Federal Expenditures, and State and Local Expenditures to
construct indices of uncertainty about policy-related macroeconomic variables.
We also consider a second version of the index, which is exclusively news-based. This index draws on
newspaper archives from the Access World News’ NewsBank service. The database contains the archives
of thousands of newspapers and other news sources from all over the world. While NewsBank has a wide
range of news sources, from newspapers to magazines to newswire services, Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016)
conduct the analysis only utilizing newspaper sources. Specifically, they restrict the analysis to newspapers
in the United States, of which NewsBank covers more than 1000. These newspapers range from large national
papers to small local newspapers across the country.
The primary measure for this index is the number of articles that contain at least one term from each of
3 sets of terms. The first set is “economic” or “economy”. The second is “uncertain” or “uncertainty”. The
third set includes “legislation”, “deficit”, “regulation”, “Congress”, “Federal Reserve”, and “White House”.
The number of newspapers that NewsBank covers over time has increased substantially, from 18 in 1985 to
over 1800 by 2008. To correct for this growth, the authors normalize the index by relating the number of
economic policy uncertainty articles to the total number of newspaper articles.
The summary statistics in Table 1, Panel B, show that the economic policy uncertainty index has a
relatively symmetric distribution, with a sample mean of 109.9 and a median of 104.4. The standard
deviation is 32.9, and the interquartile range is between 84.3 and 126.4. For the news-based version of the
index, the sample mean and the median are 114.4 and 105.1, respectively. The standard deviation is 42.8,
and the interquartile range is between 84.4 and 134.2.
Political sentiment
We also construct a measure of nationwide political sentiment. To this end, we consider the U.S. pres-
ident’s monthly approval rating polls from Gallup, and aggregate them at the quarterly frequency. The
data is collected nationwide from Gallup via telephone interviews. The number of respondents per poll is
approximately 1,500 adults, and the typical question asked is “Do you approve or disapprove of the way the
president is handling his job?”. The answer can be positive, negative, or neutral. The overall proportion of
positive (negative) answers is commonly referred to as presidential approval (disapproval) ratings. To the
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extent that political beliefs affect expectations, the president’s supporters and opponents can be thought of
as optimists and pessimists, respectively.
Following previous research, we define political sentiment as the difference between approval and disap-
proval ratings (Abramowitz, 2004, 2008). When net disapproval is positive, presidential opponents outnum-
ber the president’s supporters, which implies that the overall level of political sentiment in the country is
low. In our sample, we find that 45 quarters fall into positive net disapproval periods, and 90 under negative
net disapproval, where the latter represent the instance in which approval ratings are above disapproval rat-
ings. In the analysis that follows, we use net disapproval both for a sample breakdown and as a moderating
variable in the relation between institutional herding and political uncertainty.
Controls
The analysis also includes a number of financial, economic, and political controls. The financial variables
are excess returns on the market portfolio over the quarter, along with average excess returns over the
previous year, and the standard deviation of excess returns over the previous year. The market portfolio is
defined as the set of all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, and is retrieved from Kenneth
French’s website. The average quarterly excess return on the stock market portfolio is 1.26%, with a median
of 2.84%, and a standard deviation of 11.98%.
The economic variables are the six macroeconomic indicators from Baker and Wurgler (2006). The list
includes the growth in the industrial production index, growth in personal consumption expenditures on
durables, nondurables, and services, growth in employment, and a dummy variable that assumes the value
of unity for NBER recessions. All variables are retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The average
growth rate is equal to 0.49% for the industrial production index, 1.04% for consumption of durable goods,
1.01% for consumption of nondurable goods, 1.01% for consumption of services, and 0.33% for employment.
Of all the quarters in the sample, about 8% fall under recession periods.
Finally, the political indicators include a set of dummy variables for each of the presidential term-years,
and a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for Democratic presidents. The political affiliation of
the presidency is almost equally split between Democrats and Republicans over the sample period, where
the former occupied the White House 47% of the time.
3. Empirical analysis
We present the empirical findings as follows. First, we estimate the relation between institutional herding
and economic policy uncertainty in our baseline regressions. Second, we explore a number of additional
implications of our story, along with some alternative explanations. Finally, we analyze politically-motivated
herding within specific stock categories of interest.
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3.1. Baseline regressions
To estimate the relation between institutional herding and economic policy uncertainty, we estimate the
following regression:
yt = β0 + β1EPUt + γ
′Xt + εt, (5)
where yt is stock-level institutional herding, EPUt is economic policy uncertainty, and Xt is a vector that
includes the economic, financial, and political controls introduced above. Given the persistent nature of
both the dependent and the main independent variables, we use Newey-West standard errors.9 Following
our theoretical arguments, we expect β1 > 0.
In Table 2, we consider the primary specification of the economic policy uncertainty index. The estimates
are in Panel A. Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient of economic policy uncertainty is positive
and significant across all specifications. For the herding measures over stocks with at least 1, 5, 10, or 20
institutional traders, respectively, the coefficient of interest is equal to 0.04 (t-stat 2.29), 0.12 (t-stat 2.65),
0.15 (t-stat 2.48), and 0.13 (t-stat 2.02). Next, we test our conjecture that the effect of economic policy
uncertainty on institutional herd behavior should be more pronounced in times of low political sentiment.
To this end, we define periods of low (high) political sentiment as those in which net disapproval is positive
(negative). Then, we re-estimate the test equation separately in each of these subsamples.
The results are outlined in Table 2, Panels B and C. We find that the effect of economic policy uncertainty
on institutional herding is confined in times of low political sentiment. The estimates are highly significant,
and substantially increase in magnitude. For the herding measures over stocks with at least 1, 5, 10, or 20
institutional traders, respectively, the coefficient of interest is equal to 0.10 (t-stat 1.92), 0.30 (t-stat 2.66),
0.37 (t-stat 2.70), and 0.38 (t-stat 2.78). On the other hand, none of the coefficients are significant in the
subsample of high political sentiment.
To test whether the coefficients are significantly different across periods of high and low political senti-
ment, we estimate an additional specification in which we add an interaction term between economic policy
uncertainty and net disapproval, and also net disapproval as a standalone variable as a control. The results
are in Table 2, Panel D. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant, which indicates
that the effect of economic policy uncertainty on institutional herding is significantly larger in times of low
sentiment.
To get a sense of the magnitude, consider a one-standard-deviation increase in economic policy uncer-
tainty. For each of the four herding measures, this prompts an increase in institutional herding of respectively
20%, 29%, 29%, and 24% of a standard deviation in the full sample. In the low-sentiment subsample, the
effect increases to 50%, 73%, 76%, and 71% of a standard deviation. In Table 3, we repeat the analysis for
the news-based specification of the economic policy uncertainty index. We find a similar empirical pattern.
9The autocorrelation coefficients are 0.39, 0.69, 0.70, and 0.68 for the herding measures over stocks with at least 1, 5, 10, or
20 institutional traders, respectively (p-value < 0.01). For the two measures of economic policy uncertainty, the autocorrelation
coefficients are respectively equal to 0.63 and 0.41 (p-value < 0.01). None of these variables contain a unit root.
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In Panel A, we find that the coefficient of economic policy uncertainty is positive and significant. In Panels
B and C, we find that the results are stronger in times of low political sentiment. In Panel D, we find that
this difference is statistically significant.10
The economic magnitude of the effect is similar to that from the previous specification. A one-standard-
deviation increase in economic policy uncertainty prompts an increase in institutional herding of respectively
20%, 35%, 40%, and 36% of a standard deviation for each of the four herding measures in the full sample.
In the low-sentiment subsample, the effect increases to respectively 46%, 69%, 72%, and 68% of a standard
deviation.
Overall, we find that U.S. institutional investors herd more when political uncertainty rises, and this
pattern amplifies during periods of adverse political sentiment toward the president in office. These results




To provide validation to our interpretation of the results, we test two specific implications of our story.
First, we acknowledge that a high degree of economic policy uncertainty makes policies harder to assess
and/or predict, which in turn should translate into greater differences of opinion (see, e.g., Bloom, 2014).
As a result, we expect to find a similar positive association between our herding measures and dispersion of
economic policy evaluations. Second, high economic policy uncertainty also makes economic outcomes less
predictable. In turn, this implies a positive relation between institutional herding and differences of opinion
over future business conditions.
In the spirit of Li and Li (2014), we respectively identify these two variables as the evaluation of govern-
ment economic policy (GOVT) and the 12-month business conditions forecast (BEXP) from the Thomson
Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers. We also acknowledge that the data only includes
qualitative responses, therefore we transform the series following Li and Li (2014). We delete “N/A” and “I
don’t know” responses, and impose a (−1, 1) domain for the answers (positive = 1, neutral = 0, negative
= −1).11 To calculate the standard deviation of beliefs, we construct a negative Herfindahl index, so that
higher values indicate greater dispersion of opinion.
The results for GOVT are in Table 4. In Panel A, we consider the full sample. Consistent with the ex-
pectations, the coefficient of interest is positive and significant in most specifications. For each of the herding
10In untabulated tests, we find similar results when expressing either version of the economic policy uncertainty index in logs
rather than levels.
11For BEXP, the survey question is “(...) About a year from now, do you expect that in the country as a whole business
conditions will be better, or worse than they are at present, or just about the same?”, and the answers are “Better”, “About the
same”, “Worse”, “I don’t know”, and “N/A”. For GOVT, the survey question is “As to the economic policy of the government
– I mean steps taken to fight inflation or unemployment – would you say the government is doing a good job, only fair, or a
poor job?”, and the answers are “Good”, “Only fair”, “Poor”, “I don’t know”, and “N/A”.
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measures under consideration, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in dispersion of opinion over
government policy is associated with an increase in institutional herding of respectively 30%, 40%, 31%, and
25% (although not significant) of a standard deviation.
In Panels B and C, we split the sample into periods of low and high political sentiment, respectively. In
low-sentiment periods, the estimates become substantially larger in both magnitude and significance, and
respectively equal to 56%, 84%, 77%, and 72% of a standard deviation in institutional herding. Conversely,
the estimates are close to zero in both magnitude and significance in the high-sentiment subsample. In Panel
D, we find that the difference in magnitude across subsamples is also statistically significant.
In Table 5, we present the results for BEXP. We find similar estimates. In the full sample (Panel A), a
one-standard-deviation increase in dispersion of opinion over future economic conditions is associated with
an increase in institutional herding of respectively 21%, 38%, 38%, and 36% of a standard deviation. The
estimates become larger and highly significant in the low-sentiment subsample (Panel B), and equal respec-
tively to 97%, 110%, 129%, and 131% of a standard deviation in institutional herding, whereas they are not
significant in the high-sentiment subsample (Panel C). Again, we find that the estimates are statistically
different across these two subsamples (Panel D).
The above findings denote that herding among U.S. fund managers rises in divergence of opinion on
contemporaneous and future economic outcomes. As such divergence is expected to grow more pronounced
during politically uncertain periods, the empirical patterns emerging from these additional tests are in line
with those from our baseline regressions, thus confirming that political uncertainty enhances institutional
herding, more strongly so in the presence of negative political sentiment.
Sample breakdown
Previous research finds a structural shift in mutual-fund herding around the mid-1990s, due to a large
increase in the market share of equity funds in the United States. In the period 1975-1994, U.S. mutual-fund
herding was relatively limited, and mostly associated with an improvement in market efficiency (Wermers,
1999). In the subsequent period, however, mutual-fund herding increased and became destabilizing for stock
prices, leading to substantial return reversals (Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo, 2011; Brown, Wei, and Werm-
ers, 2014).
In light of these findings, we analyze whether politically-motivated herding also exhibits a similar pattern.
If mutual-fund herding was indeed less aggressive before the mid-1990s, we expect the relation between in-
stitutional herding and economic policy uncertainty to be weaker in that subperiod. To test this conjecture,
we follow Dasgupta, Prat, and Verardo (2011) and introduce a pre-1994 period dummy, defined as a variable
that takes on the value of one for the period from 1985q1 to 1993q4, and zero otherwise, and interact it with
our variables of interest.
Results are reported in Table 6. Consistent with our expectation, we find that the coefficients of the inter-
action terms between our variables of interest and the pre-1994 period dummy are negative and significant,
with the only exception observed for stocks held by at least 20 institutional investors (where the coefficients
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are outside the rejection region). The effect of economic policy uncertainty on institutional herding then
appears to be mostly limited to the post-1994 subsample, which lends support to the idea that institutional
herding became substantially stronger in that period.
Career concerns
Institutional herd behavior seems to be related, at least in part, to reputational and career concerns of
portfolio managers (see, e.g., Dasgupta, Prat, Verardo, 2011; Brown, Wei, and Wermers, 2014). In our anal-
ysis, we test whether this motive also underlies politically-motivated herding. If so, we expect institutional
herding to be particularly pronounced in times when the mutual-fund industry is more likely to come under
scrutiny, due for example to collectively poor performance or slower growth. This is when a fund manager’s
reputation is more likely to be questioned, and job security challenged.
To test this hypothesis, we proceed as follows. In the spirit of Colacito, Croce, Ho, and Howard (2018),
we identify shocks to the growth rate of aggregate mutual-fund equity holdings, calculated through an AR(1)
model, as a state variable that indicates unexpected mutual-fund growth in the equity market. Then we
construct a dummy variable that takes on the value of one when such shocks are positive at the end of
the previous quarter, and zero otherwise, and interact it with our variables of interest. We expect career
concerns, and therefore politically-motivated herding, to be less pronounced after positive shocks.
The results are in Table 7. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that the coefficient of the interaction
term between the positive-shock dummy and the economic policy uncertainty index is negative and signifi-
cant, the only exception being that of herding for stocks held by at least one institutional investor (where
the coefficient is slightly outside of the rejection region). These findings indicate that politically-motivated
herding is substantially dampened following positive shocks to aggregate mutual-fund growth. The effect is
more pronounced in times of low net disapproval, even though with weaker statistical significance.
Our findings, therefore, denote that political uncertainty tends to boost herding among U.S. fund man-
agers during periods of negative growth in their equity investments, thus suggesting that political uncertainty
amplifies the impact of adverse industry prospects among fund managers in their decision to herd. Over-
all, this empirical pattern lends novel support to the idea that reputational and career concerns play an
important role in institutional herding.
Alternative explanations
DeVault, Sias, and Starks (2019) show that Baker and Wurgler’s (2006, 2007) investor sentiment index
explains shocks in institutional investor demand. Then a potential concern is that the effect of economic
policy uncertainty on institutional herding may partly overlap with the effect of investor sentiment. To rule
out this possibility, we augment our baseline regression with Baker and Wurgler’s (2007) monthly investor
sentiment index, which we transform into a quarterly series.12
12This measure captures changes in asset demand not explained by economic fundamentals, and is based on a number of
proxies suggested in previous literature, including the closed-end fund discount, the NYSE share turnover, the number and
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The results are in Table 8, Panel A. Reassuringly, we find that the coefficient of economic policy un-
certainty remains positive and significant for all four herding specifications. Interestingly, the coefficient of
investor sentiment is negative all throughout (even though only significant for the first two specifications).
Given the pervasive impact of investor sentiment on asset prices (see, e.g., Baker and Wurgler, 2006), this
result is in line with the idea that institutional investors herd more when they expect stock prices to decline
(Brown, Wei, and Wermers, 2014).
Another potential concern is that economic policy uncertainty may capture some form of financial uncer-
tainty, such as implied volatility, which is also associated with herding in its own right (see, e.g., Economou,
Hassapis, and Philippas, 2018). To address this point, we augment the baseline regressions with the Chicago
Board of Options and Exchange volatility index (VIX). The results are in Table 8, Panel B. Again, we find
that the estimates are largely unaffected by the inclusion of this additional variable. It seems then that it is
genuine political uncertainty that drives the results.
3.3. Stock categories
Size breakdown
We begin our analysis of specific stock categories by performing a sample breakdown based on market
capitalization. Stocks of small size are riskier than large stocks, and command a risk premium (see, e.g., Fama
and French, 1992, 1993). The higher risk that characterizes these stocks, however, should also make them
more sensitive to political uncertainty. As a result, we expect them to attract more politically-motivated
herding (compared with large stocks), more so in times of low political sentiment.
To test this prediction, we split the sample according to company size. We define large and small stocks,
respectively, as those with above- and below-median market capitalization, and held by at least 5 institutional
investors.13 We re-estimate our baseline regressions for each of these subsamples, and then directly compare
the institutional herding measures across small and large stocks.
The results are in Table 9, Panel A, columns (1) to (3). We find a positive and significant association
between economic policy uncertainty and institutional herding for both small and large stocks. The effect,
however, is more pronounced among the former. A one-standard-deviation increase in economic policy
uncertainty is associated with an increase in institutional herding equal to 38% of a standard deviation for
small stocks, and 22% of a standard deviation for large stocks. The difference is also statistically significant.
In columns (4) to (6), we introduce net disapproval ratings. Consistent with our expectation, we find that
politically-motivated herding is more pronounced for small stocks in times of low political sentiment, whereas
the effect does not vary with sentiment among large stocks. The difference between these two coefficients is
also statistically significant. Overall, these results lend support to our prediction that small stocks are more
sensitive to political uncertainty, especially so in times of low political sentiment.
average first-day returns on IPOs, the equity share in new issues, and the dividend premium.
13This choice reflects the trade-off between minimizing the effect of common styles across funds, and avoiding stocks whose
coverage is too sparse.
14
Political connections
In the second group of tests, we study the effect of political connections. To identify politically-connected
companies in the universe of U.S. stocks, we proceed as follows. Building on the methodology from Bonaparte,
Kumar, and Page (2017), we match the zip code of company headquarters with state-level voting data in
presidential elections. Then we define companies as politically connected if they are located in states that
exhibit the same political affiliation as the White House. This choice incorporates the idea that politically-
affiliated governors may provide firms access to the office of the presidency.
Companies that lack this connection, on the other hand, are at a political disadvantage compared with
politically-connected firms. Since companies with less political connections have more uncertain prospects
(see, e.g., Fisman, 2001; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006), we hypothesize that unconnected companies
face greater political uncertainty, and should then be the target of greater politically-motivated herding.
We test this hypothesis in Table 10, columns (1) to (3). We find that the coefficient of economic policy
uncertainty is positive and significant among both connected and unconnected companies (columns 1 and
2).14 However, a one-standard-deviation increase in economic policy uncertainty is associated with an
increase in institutional herding of 44% of a standard deviation for connected firms, and 31% of a standard
deviation for unconnected ones, and the difference is not only economically but also statistically significant
(column 3). Consistent with our conjecture, then, the relation between institutional herding and economic
policy uncertainty is significantly stronger for companies located in states that are not politically aligned
with the White House.
Next, we study how this relation varies with political sentiment. The results are in columns (4) to (6).
We find that the results from the unconditional tests only hold in times of high political sentiment. When
political sentiment is low, instead, politically-motivated herding actually becomes stronger for connected
companies. The results suggest that there is a dark side to political connections, as being linked to an
unpopular administration can make the company’s prospects more uncertain. This mechanism provides a
new kind of confirmation to the idea that politically-connected firms suffer disproportionately more from
negative shocks to the politicians they support (see, e.g., Fisman, 2001).
Presidential affiliation
Recent research shows that Republican administrations have been historically associated with a number
of tough and controversial issues in the postwar era, such as adverse oil shocks, lower total factor productivity
performance, a generally less favorable international environment, lower consumer optimism, and an overall
less predictable economy. Pástor and Veronesi (2018) argue that this association might not be random,
because it is theoretically optimal for electors to choose Republican presidential candidates when they prefer
less insurance from government and more business risk.
Drawing on these insights, we expect economic policy uncertainty to have a stronger effect on institu-
14Unfortunately, there is one missing observation for the herding measure of unconnected companies.
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tional herding under Republican administrations. The intuition is that higher risk makes it comparatively
harder to assess the impact of current policies, and/or make predictions on future alternative policies. If risk
is positively associated with Republican presidencies, then we expect the latter to represent a moderating
variable in the relation between economic policy uncertainty and institutional herding.
To test this hypothesis, we augment our baseline regressions with an interaction term between economic
policy uncertainty and the Democratic dummy, and identify a number of specific stock categories that are
more sensitive to the political affiliation of the presidency. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) show that U.S.
stock returns earn a substantial premium under Democratic presidencies, and that the effect is particularly
pronounced among small stocks. The intuition is that small stocks are particularly sensitive to systematic
risk (Cooley and Quadrini, 1997; Perez-Quiros and Timmermann, 2000), and therefore also to nationwide
economic policies. In light of this, we expect politically-motivated herding to be more pronounced among
small stocks under Republican presidencies.
The results are in Table 11, column (1). We find again that the coefficient of economic policy uncer-
tainty as a standalone variable is positive and significant. Specifically, the effect of a one-standard-deviation
increase in economic policy uncertainty on institutional herding is 31% (of a standard deviation) stronger
for small stocks when compared with large stocks. Interestingly, however, the effect is entirely concentrated
under Republican presidencies. Under Democratic administrations, politically-motivated herding does not
differ across small and large stocks.
Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) identify a number of stock categories that are particularly divisive across
party lines, and define them as politically sensitive.15 They argue that Republicans tend to be more lenient
on issues such as environmental damage, smoking, and guns. For these industries, then, shifts in the political
affiliation of the presidency have an important bearing on future economic prospects.
The mechanism we propose is as follows. As Republicans introduce more favorable legislation on
politically-sensitive industries, they also make these stocks riskier because most of the provisions will likely
be modified or reversed under future Democratic administrations. In light of this, we expect politically-
motivated herding to be more pronounced on politically-sensitive stocks relative to non-sensitive stocks
under Republican presidencies.
The results are in Table 11, column (2). We find evidence in support of our conjecture. While the
coefficient of economic policy uncertainty as a standalone variable is positive and (marginally) significant,
the coefficient of its interaction term with the Democratic dummy is negative and significant. Politically
sensitive stocks attract indeed greater politically-motivated herding, but only under Republican presidencies.
In the last group of tests, we estimate two measures of firm-level political risk. First, we calculate the
EPU beta of each stock in the sample, estimated through a three-year rolling window controlling for excess
15Such stocks are from the following industries (SIC codes in parentheses): tobacco (2100-2199); guns and defense (3760-
3769, 3795, 3480-3489); natural resources, including forestry (0800-0899) and mining (1000-1119, 1400-1499); and alcohol (2080,
2082-2085).
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returns on the U.S. stock market portfolio, defined as the set of all stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ. Then, we identify stocks with high firm-level political risk as those that exhibit an above-median
EPU beta. Second, we consider the measure of firm-level political risk from Hassan, Hollander, van Lent,
and Tahoun (2019), and divide again stocks with above- and below-median risk.16
Given their higher sensitivity to the political environment, we expect these stocks labeled as politically
risky to have particularly uncertain prospects under Republican presidencies. To test this hypothesis, we
directly compare politically-motivated herding on stocks with an above- and below-median level of political
risk, following either of the definitions introduced above, and study how this relation varies with presidential
affiliation.
The results are in Table 11, columns (3) and (4). The results are analogous for both specifications. We
find that politically-risky (i.e., above-median) stocks do indeed attract greater politically-motivated herding
than less risky (i.e., below-median) ones, but only under Republican presidencies. Under Democratic ad-
ministrations, the effect disappears.
In additional tests, we find that none of these results are driven by correlation between institutional herd-
ing and the president’s political affiliation, or between political affiliation and economic policy uncertainty.
Rather, there seems to be a genuine structural break in politically-motivated herding. Overall, the empirical
evidence lends support to the idea that Republican presidencies are associated with greater risk.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we show that economic policy uncertainty generates substantial herd behavior among
institutional investors. Our analysis builds on two well-known mechanisms. First, noisier signals constitute
an incentive for institutional investors to mimic each other’s trades. Second, institutional investors face
reputational and litigation costs when their behavior deviates from the “herd”, and especially so in the
presence of negative stock information. In light of the fact that political uncertainty makes investor beliefs
noisier and depresses stock prices, we expect both channels to be operational. Our empirical findings lend
support to this conjecture.
We find that the results are particularly strong in times of low presidential popularity, which is in line with
the idea that unpopular administrations steer towards riskier policies to try and win back the electorate. The
estimates are also stronger for riskier stocks, defined as those characterized by small market capitalization
and weak political connections, and for stocks that are commonly thought of as politically sensitive. While
a growing body of literature unveils a link between political evaluations and a number of financial outcomes,
this is the first paper to show that such evaluations also generate institutional herd behavior.
The results suggest that the economic and financial costs of political uncertainty might be larger than
previously thought. To the extent that herding can destabilize stock prices, the increase in institutional
16Unfortunately, this measure is only available from 2002q2.
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herding that takes place in times of high economic policy uncertainty should create additional noise in the
stock market and alter the cost of equity in its own right. In future research, it would be interesting to
quantify these effects both theoretically and empirically, both in the U.S. and internationally.
Overall, our findings are of particular interest to the investment community, as they can constitute useful
input for investors with a U.S. market outlook. To the extent that U.S. quarterly institutional investors’
holdings constitute public information that is periodically disclosed, an investor could extrapolate from them
to predict future institutional demand conditional on variations of political uncertainty (and sentiment) across
periods/stocks in the context of an ad hoc strategy. As far as regulators and policy makers are concerned, the
evidence presented suggests the need for potential inclusion of the political sensitivities of stocks/industries
in the curriculum of financial education initiatives, in order to enhance investors’ awareness of this issue.
References
Abramowitz, Alan I., 2004. When good forecasts go bad: The time-for-change model and the 2004 presi-
dential election. Political Science and Politics 37, 745-746.
Abramowitz, Alan I., 2008. Forecasting the 2008 presidential election with the time-for-change model.
Political Science and Politics 41, 691-695.
Addoum, Jawad M., and Alok Kumar, 2016. Political sentiment and predictable returns. Review of Financial
Studies 29, 3471–3518.
Baker, Malcolm, and Jeffrey Wurgler, 2006 Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns. Journal
of Finance 61, 1645-1680.
Baker, Malcolm, and Jeffrey Wurgler, 2007. Investor sentiment in the stock market. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 21, 129-151.
Baker, Scott R., Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis. 2016. Measuring economic policy uncertainty. Quar-
terly Journal of Economics 131, 1593-1636.
Banerjee, Abhijit V., 1992. A simple model of herd behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107, 797-817.
Bernanke, Ben S., 1983. Irreversibility, uncertainty, and cyclical investment. Quarterly Journal of Economics
98, 85-106.
Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch, 1992. A theory of fads, fashion, custom, and
cultural change as informational cascades. Journal of Political Economy 100, 992-1026.
Blinder, Alan S., and Mark W. Watson, 2016. Presidents and the U.S. economy: An econometric explo-
ration. American Economic Review 106, 1015-1045.
Bloom, Nicholas, 2014. Fluctuations in uncertainty. Journal of Economic Perspectives 28, 153-176.
Bloom, Nicholas, Stephen Bond, and John Van Reenen, 2007. Uncertainty and investment dynamics. Review
of Economic Studies 74, 391-415.
Bonaparte, Yosef, Alok Kumar, and Jeremy K. Page, 2017. Political climate, optimism, and investment
decisions. Journal of Financial Markets 34, 69-94.
Boutchkova, Maria, Hitesh Doshi, Art Durnev, and Alexander Molchanov, 2012. Precarious politics and
return volatility. Review of Financial Studies 25, 1111-1154.
18
Brogaard, Jonathan, and Andrew Detzel, 2015. The asset-pricing implications of government economic
policy uncertainty. Management Science 61, 3-18.
Brown, Nerissa C., Kelsey D. Wei, and Russ Wermers, 2014. Analyst recommendations, mutual fund
herding, and overreaction in stock prices. Management Science 60, 1-20.
Celiker, Umut, Jaideep Chowdhury, and Gokhan Sonaer, 2015. Do mutual funds herd in industries? Journal
of Banking and Finance 52, 1-16.
Choi, Nicole, and Richard W. Sias, 2009. Institutional industry herding. Journal of Financial Economics
94, 469-491.
Colacito, Ric, Max Croce, Steven Ho, and Philip Howard, 2018. BKK the EZ Way. American Economic
Review 108, 3416-3449.
Cooley, Thomas and Vincenzo Quadrini, 1997. Monetary policy and the financial decisions of firms. Mimeo,
University of Rochester.
Dasgupta, Amil, Andrea Prat, and Michela Verardo, 2014. Institutional trade persistence and long-term
equity returns. Journal of Finance 66, 635-653.
DeVault, Luke, Asher, Richard W. Sias, and Laura T. Starks, 2019. Sentiment metrics and investor demand.
Journal of Finance 74, 985-1024.
Devenow, Andrea, and Ivo Welch, 1996. Rational herding in financial economics. European Economic Review
40, 603-615.
Downs, George W., and David M. Rocke, 1994. Conflict, agency, and gambling for resurrection: The
principal-agent problem goes to war. American Journal of Political Science 38, 362-380.
Economou, Fotini, Christis Hassapis, and Nikolaos Philippas, 2018. Investors’ fear and herding in the stock
market. Applied Economics 50, 3654-3663.
Faccio, Mara, Ronald Masulis, and John McConnell, 2006. Political connections and corporate bailouts.
Journal of Finance 61, 2597–2635.
Falkenstein, Eric G., 1996. Preferences for stock characteristics as revealed by mutual fund portfolio hold-
ings. Journal of Finance 51, 111-135.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1992. The cross-section of expected stock returns. Journal of
Finance 46, 427-466.
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds.
Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56.
Fisman, Raymond, 2001. Estimating the value of political connections. American Economic Review 91,
1095-1102.
Frijns, Bart, Aaron Gilbert, and Remco C.J. Zwinkels, 2016. On the style-based feedback trading of mutual
fund managers. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 51, 771-800.
Froot, Kenneth A., David S. Scharfstein, and Jeremy C. Stein, 1992. Herd on the street: Informational
inefficiencies in a market with short-term speculation. Journal of Finance 47, 1461-1484.
Hassan, Tarek A., Stephan Hollander, L.A.G.M. van Lent, and Ahmed Tahoun, 2019. Firm-level political
risk: Measurement and effects. Quarterly Journal of Economics 134, 2135-2202.
Hassett, Kevin A., and Gilbert E. Metcalf, 1999. Investment with uncertain tax policy: Does random tax
policy discourage investment? Economic Journal 109, 372-393.
Hirshleifer, David, Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, and Sheridan Titman, 1994. Security analysis and trading
patterns when some investors receive information before others. Journal of Finance 49, 1665-1698.
19
Hirshleifer, David, Siew Hong Teoh, 2003. Herd behavior and cascading in capital markets: A review and
synthesis. European Financial Management 9, 25-66.
Hong, Harrison, and Leonard Kostovetsky, 2012. Red and blue investing: Values and finance. Journal of
Financial Economics 103, 1-19.
Jens, Candace E., 2017. Political uncertainty and investment: Causal evidence from U.S. gubernatorial
elections. Journal of Financial Economics 124, 563-579.
Jiang, Hao, and Michela Verardo, 2018. Does herding behavior reveal skill? An analysis of mutual fund
performance. Journal of Finance 73, 2229-2269.
Julio, Brandon, and Youngsuk Yook, 2012. Political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles. Journal
of Finance 67, 45-84.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Summary statistics for the main variables used in our analysis. The variables are: herding measures (H) over stocks held by at least
1, 5, 10, or 20 institutional traders, constructed using U.S. 13F institutional ownership quarterly data and following the methodology
from Sias (2004); the U.S. economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), along with a news-based
version of the index; net disapproval ratings, defined as the difference between Gallup’s disapproval and approval ratings over the U.S.
president’s job; a dummy variable that takes on value one of the U.S. president is a Democrat, and zero otherwise; excess stock returns
on the market portfolio over the quarter (RmRf), retrieved from Kenneth French’s website, along with average excess returns over
the previous year (RmRf, 1y-mean), and the standard deviation of excess returns over the previous year (RmRf, 1y-SD); growth in
the industrial production (IPI) index, growth in personal consumption expenditures on durables (PCED), nondurables (PCEND), and
services (PCES), growth in employment, and a dummy variable that takes on one for NBER recessions, all retrieved from the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. The sample period is from the first quarter of 1985 through the fourth quarter of 2019.
Panel A. Herding
Variable Mean SD P25 Median P75
H1 0.1109 0.0657 0.0789 0.1049 0.1536
H5 0.2773 0.1360 0.2150 0.2521 0.3253
H10 0.3471 0.1609 0.2864 0.3202 0.4054
H20 0.4034 0.1769 0.3392 0.3975 0.4752
Panel B. Politics
Variable Mean SD P25 Median P75
EPU (primary) 109.9 32.9 84.3 104.4 126.4
EPU (news-based) 114.4 42.8 84.4 105.1 134.2
Net disapproval -0.1113 0.2436 -0.2750 -0.0850 0.0500
Democrat 0.4706 0.5010 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000
Panel C. Stock market
Variable Mean SD P25 Median P75
RmRf 0.0126 0.1198 -0.0498 0.0284 0.0875
RmRf (1y-mean) 0.0181 0.0407 0.0005 0.0261 0.0449
RmRf (1y-SD) 0.0402 0.0180 0.0264 0.0383 0.0509
Panel D. Economic growth
Variable Mean SD P25 Median P75
IPI growth 0.0049 0.0132 0.0010 0.0069 0.0111
PCED growth 0.0104 0.0318 -0.0039 0.0124 0.0252
PCEND growth 0.0101 0.0149 0.0029 0.0113 0.0180
PCES growth 0.0139 0.0057 0.0105 0.0139 0.0173
Employment growth 0.0033 0.0043 0.0021 0.0041 0.0062
NBER 0.0809 0.2737 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
21
Table 2. Herding and economic policy uncertainty
Time-series regressions of herding measures (H) over stocks held by at least 1, 5, 10, or 20 institutional traders, constructed using
U.S. 13F institutional ownership quarterly data and following the methodology from Sias (2004), the U.S. economic policy uncertainty
(EPU) index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), and a vector of financial, economic, and political controls. The financial controls
include excess stock returns on the market portfolio over the quarter, retrieved from Kenneth French’s website, along with average
excess returns over the previous year, and the standard deviation of excess returns over the previous year. Economic controls include
the growth in the industrial production index, growth in personal consumption expenditures on durables, nondurables, and services,
growth in employment, and a dummy variable that takes on one for NBER recessions, all retrieved from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. The political controls include a set of dummy variables that take on value one for each of the U.S. president’s term-years, and
a dummy variable that takes on value one of the U.S. president is a Democrat. Panel A includes the full sample. Panels B and C only
include the subperiod in which the Gallup’s presidential net disapproval ratings (ND) are positive and negative, respectively. Panel D
includes the full sample and adds an interaction term between the index of economic policy uncertainty and net disapproval ratings, as
well as standalone net disapproval ratings as a control. The sample period is from the first quarter of 1985 through the fourth quarter
of 2019. Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent t-stats are in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
Panel A. Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU 0.0004** 0.0012*** 0.0015** 0.0013**
2.29 2.65 2.48 2.02
Adj. R-squared 0.006 0.107 0.108 0.098
Observations 135 135 135 135
Panel B. ND > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU 0.0010* 0.0030*** 0.0037*** 0.0038***
1.92 2.66 2.70 2.78
Adj. R-squared -0.015 0.111 0.106 0.063
Observations 45 45 45 45
Panel C. ND < 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU 0.0001 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001
0.98 0.91 0.82 0.14
Adj. R-squared 0.071 0.245 0.206 0.200
Observations 90 90 90 90
Panel D. Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU 0.0006*** 0.0014*** 0.0017*** 0.0017**
3.07 3.09 2.92 2.42
EPU x ND 0.0016*** 0.0024** 0.0032** 0.0040**
2.74 2.03 2.14 2.30
Adj. R-squared 0.050 0.113 0.121 0.119
Observations 135 135 135 135
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Table 3. Herding and news-based economic policy uncertainty
Time-series regressions of herding measures (H) over stocks held by at least 1, 5, 10, or 20 institutional traders, constructed using
U.S. 13F institutional ownership quarterly data and following the methodology from Sias (2004), the news-based U.S. economic policy
uncertainty (EPU) index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), and a vector of financial, economic, and political controls. The financial
controls include excess stock returns on the market portfolio over the quarter, retrieved from Kenneth French’s website, along with
average excess returns over the previous year, and the standard deviation of excess returns over the previous year. Economic controls
include the growth in the industrial production index, growth in personal consumption expenditures on durables, nondurables, and
services, growth in employment, and a dummy variable that takes on one for NBER recessions, all retrieved from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. The political controls include a set of dummy variables that take on value one for each of the U.S. president’s term-years, and
a dummy variable that takes on value one of the U.S. president is a Democrat. Panel A includes the full sample. Panels B and C only
include the subperiod in which the Gallup’s presidential net disapproval ratings (ND) are positive and negative, respectively. Panel D
includes the full sample and adds an interaction term between the index of economic policy uncertainty and net disapproval ratings, as
well as standalone net disapproval ratings as a control. The sample period is from the first quarter of 1985 through the fourth quarter
of 2019. Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent t-stats are in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
Panel A. Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU 0.0003 0.0011*** 0.0015*** 0.0015***
1.34 2.80 3.09 2.87
Adj. R-squared -0.008 0.144 0.161 0.152
Observations 135 135 135 135
Panel B. ND > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU 0.0007** 0.0022*** 0.0027*** 0.0028***
2.26 4.15 4.27 4.27
Adj. R-squared -0.005 0.137 0.140 0.096
Observations 45 45 45 45
Panel C. ND < 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU -0.0001 0.0004* 0.0006** 0.0005**
-0.37 1.88 2.38 2.22
Adj. R-squared 0.065 0.260 0.238 0.223
Observations 90 90 90 90
Panel D. Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU 0.0004*** 0.0014*** 0.0017*** 0.0018***
3.22 3.60 3.69 3.40
EPU x ND 0.0014*** 0.0020*** 0.0023*** 0.0027***
4.11 2.91 2.72 2.73
Adj. R-squared 0.076 0.168 0.183 0.178
Observations 135 135 135 135
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Table 4. Herding and dispersion of opinion over government economic policy
Time-series regressions of herding measures (H) over stocks held by at least 1, 5, 10, or 20 institutional traders, constructed using
U.S. 13F institutional ownership quarterly data and following the methodology from Sias (2004), dispersion of opinion over government
economic policy (GOVT), and a vector of financial, economic, and political controls. Dispersion of opinion over government economic
policy is calculated following Li and Li (2014), using data from the Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers.
The financial controls include excess stock returns on the market portfolio over the quarter, retrieved from Kenneth French’s website,
along with average excess returns over the previous year, and the standard deviation of excess returns over the previous year. Economic
controls include the growth in the industrial production index, growth in personal consumption expenditures on durables, nondurables,
and services, growth in employment, and a dummy variable that takes on one for NBER recessions, all retrieved from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. The political controls include a set of dummy variables that take on value one for each of the U.S. president’s
term-years, and a dummy variable that takes on value one of the U.S. president is a Democrat. Panel A includes the full sample.
Panels B and C only include the subperiod in which the Gallup’s presidential net disapproval ratings (ND) are positive and negative,
respectively. Panel D includes the full sample and adds an interaction term between dispersion of opinion over government economic
policy and net disapproval ratings, as well as standalone net disapproval ratings as a control. The sample period is from the first quarter
of 1985 through the fourth quarter of 2019. Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent t-stats are in parentheses (* p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
Panel A. Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
GOVT 0.6902** 1.9426** 1.7852* 1.587
2.09 2.19 1.67 1.42
Adj. R-squared 0.045 0.182 0.123 0.104
Observations 135 135 135 135
Panel B. ND > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
GOVT 1.3163*** 4.0856*** 4.4212*** 4.5130***
3.59 4.77 4.37 4.15
Adj. R-squared 0.028 0.206 0.148 0.099
Observations 45 45 45 45
Panel C. ND < 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
GOVT 0.4165 0.7706 0.4525 0.2433
1.46 1.23 0.69 0.37
Adj. R-squared 0.092 0.262 0.207 0.202
Observations 90 90 90 90
Panel D. Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
GOVT 0.6624*** 1.9401*** 1.8302** 1.6333*
2.65 2.71 2.02 1.66
GOVT x ND 2.6942** 5.8874*** 5.6594* 5.8125*
2.40 2.65 1.94 1.71
Adj. R-squared 0.097 0.225 0.154 0.129
Observations 135 135 135 135
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Table 5. Herding and dispersion of opinion over 12-month business conditions
Time-series regressions of herding measures (H) over stocks held by at least 1, 5, 10, or 20 institutional traders, constructed using U.S.
13F institutional ownership quarterly data and following the methodology from Sias (2004), dispersion of opinion over the 12-month
business conditions forecast (BEXP), and a vector of financial, economic, and political controls. Dispersion of opinion over business
conditions is calculated following Li and Li (2014), using data from the Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers.
The financial controls include excess stock returns on the market portfolio over the quarter, retrieved from Kenneth French’s website,
along with average excess returns over the previous year, and the standard deviation of excess returns over the previous year. Economic
controls include the growth in the industrial production index, growth in personal consumption expenditures on durables, nondurables,
and services, growth in employment, and a dummy variable that takes on one for NBER recessions, all retrieved from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. The political controls include a set of dummy variables that take on value one for each of the U.S. president’s
term-years, and a dummy variable that takes on value one of the U.S. president is a Democrat. Panel A includes the full sample.
Panels B and C only include the subperiod in which the Gallup’s presidential net disapproval ratings (ND) are positive and negative,
respectively. Panel D includes the full sample and adds an interaction term between dispersion of opinion over business conditions
and net disapproval ratings, as well as standalone net disapproval ratings as a control. The sample period is from the first quarter of
1985 through the fourth quarter of 2019. Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent t-stats are in parentheses (* p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
Panel A. Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
BEXP 0.4091 1.5149** 1.7709* 1.8323*
1.33 2.14 1.93 1.86
Adj. R-squared 0.005 0.154 0.147 0.145
Observations 135 135 135 135
Panel B. ND > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
BEXP 1.8519*** 4.3540*** 6.0079*** 6.6928***
5.10 4.93 6.19 6.59
Adj. R-squared 0.174 0.258 0.329 0.320
Observations 45 45 45 45
Panel C. ND < 0
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
BEXP 0.043 0.5747 0.4793 0.379
0.18 1.52 1.30 1.02
Adj. R-squared 0.064 0.263 0.215 0.208
Observations 90 90 90 90
Panel D. Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
BEXP 0.7833*** 2.2798*** 2.8976*** 3.1291***
3.06 3.29 4.06 3.64
BEXP x ND 2.8360*** 4.9041*** 6.5640*** 7.6446***
4.20 2.85 3.29 3.40
Adj. R-squared 0.119 0.222 0.254 0.263
Observations 135 135 135 135
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Table 6. Herding and economic policy uncertainty: Sample breakdown
Time-series regressions of herding measures (H) over stocks held by at least 1, 5, 10, or 20 institutional traders, constructed using U.S.
13F institutional ownership quarterly data and following the methodology from Sias (2004), the U.S. economic policy uncertainty (EPU)
index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), Gallup’s net presidential disapproval ratings (ND), defined as the difference between the
U.S. president’s disapproval and approval ratings, a dummy variable that takes on value one for the pre-1994 period, an interaction
term between herding and net disapproval, an interaction term between herding and the pre-1994 dummy, an interaction term between
herding, net disapproval, and the pre-1994 dummy, an interaction term between net disapproval and the pre-1994 dummy, and a vector
of financial, economic, and political controls. The financial controls include excess stock returns on the market portfolio over the
quarter, retrieved from Kenneth French’s website, along with average excess returns over the previous year, and the standard deviation
of excess returns over the previous year. Economic controls include the growth in the industrial production index, growth in personal
consumption expenditures on durables, nondurables, and services, growth in employment, and a dummy variable that takes on one for
NBER recessions, all retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The political controls include a set of dummy variables that
take on value one for each of the U.S. president’s term-years, and a dummy variable that takes on value one of the U.S. president
is a Democrat. The sample period is from the first quarter of 1985 through the fourth quarter of 2019. Heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent t-stats are in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU 0.0006** 0.0018*** 0.0022*** 0.0021**
2.20 2.79 2.84 2.36
EPU x Pre-1994 -0.0013** -0.0021** -0.0022** -0.0013
-2.49 -2.46 -2.12 -1.20
EPU x ND 0.0016** 0.0023* 0.0033** 0.0042**
2.34 1.72 2.11 2.25
EPU x ND x Pre-1994 -0.0044*** -0.0043* -0.0052** -0.0038
-2.84 -1.89 -2.25 -1.40
Adj. R-squared 0.089 0.121 0.132 0.116
Observations 135 135 135 135
Table 7. Herding and economic policy uncertainty: Industry-level shocks
Time-series regressions of herding measures (H) over stocks held by at least 1, 5, 10, or 20 institutional traders, constructed using
U.S. 13F institutional ownership quarterly data and following the methodology from Sias (2004), the U.S. economic policy uncertainty
(EPU) index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), Gallup’s net presidential disapproval ratings (ND), defined as the difference between
the U.S. president’s disapproval and approval ratings, a dummy variable that takes on value one for positive shocks to the growth rate
of aggregate mutual-fund equity holdings, calculated through an AR(1) model and lagged one quarter, an interaction term between
herding and net disapproval, an interaction term between herding and the positive shock dummy, an interaction term between herding,
net disapproval, and the positive shock dummy, an interaction term between net disapproval and the positive shock dummy, and a
vector of financial, economic, and political controls. The financial controls include excess stock returns on the market portfolio over
the quarter, retrieved from Kenneth French’s website, along with average excess returns over the previous year, and the standard
deviation of excess returns over the previous year. Economic controls include the growth in the industrial production index, growth
in personal consumption expenditures on durables, nondurables, and services, growth in employment, and a dummy variable that
takes on one for NBER recessions, all retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The political controls include a set of dummy
variables that take on value one for each of the U.S. president’s term-years, and a dummy variable that takes on value one of the U.S.
president is a Democrat. The sample period is from the first quarter of 1985 through the fourth quarter of 2019. Heteroskedasticity-
and autocorrelation-consistent t-stats are in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU 0.0008** 0.0022*** 0.0029*** 0.0029***
2.50 3.37 3.24 2.89
EPU x Shock+ (-1) -0.0005 -0.0014** -0.0021*** -0.0021**
-1.47 -2.36 -2.64 -2.47
EPU x ND 0.0005 0.0049* 0.0075** 0.0089**
0.44 1.91 2.19 2.22
EPU x ND x Shock+ (-1) 0.0013 -0.0031 -0.0054* -0.0059*
0.86 -1.22 -1.68 -1.66
Adj. R-squared 0.098 0.136 0.149 0.141
Observations 135 135 135 135
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Table 8. Herding and economic policy uncertainty: Additional tests
Time-series regressions of herding measures (H) over stocks held by at least 1, 5, 10, or 20 institutional traders, constructed using
U.S. 13F institutional ownership quarterly data and following the methodology from Sias (2004), the U.S. economic policy uncertainty
(EPU) index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), and a vector of financial, economic, and political controls. The financial controls
include excess stock returns on the market portfolio over the quarter, retrieved from Kenneth French’s website, along with average
excess returns over the previous year, and the standard deviation of excess returns over the previous year. Economic controls include
the growth in the industrial production index, growth in personal consumption expenditures on durables, nondurables, and services,
growth in employment, and a dummy variable that takes on one for NBER recessions, all retrieved from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. The political controls include a set of dummy variables that take on value one for each of the U.S. president’s term-years,
and a dummy variable that takes on value one of the U.S. president is a Democrat. The regressions also include Baker and Wurgler’s
(2007) investor sentiment (IS) index, orthogonalized to business cycle indicators, in Panel A, and the Chicago Board of Options and
Exchange volatility index (VIX) in Panel B. The sample period starts in first quarter of 1985 in Panel A, and in the first quarter of
1990 in Panel B, and ends in the fourth quarter of 2019. Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent t-stats are in parentheses
(* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU 0.0004** 0.0011*** 0.0013** 0.0012**
1.98 2.69 2.52 2.00
IS -0.0302*** -0.0548* -0.0494 -0.0457
-2.66 -1.78 -1.40 -1.26
Adj. R-squared 0.066 0.152 0.131 0.112
Observations 135 135 135 135
Panel B.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H5 H10 H20
EPU 0.0005** 0.0016*** 0.0018*** 0.0018**
2.21 2.96 2.66 2.32
VIX -0.0017 -0.0043* -0.0021 -0.002
-1.29 -1.78 -0.78 -0.79
Adj. R-squared -0.015 0.113 0.105 0.091
Observations 116 116 116 116
Table 9. Herding and economic policy uncertainty: Size breakdown
Time-series regressions of a herding measure (H) over stocks held by at 5 institutional traders, constructed using U.S. 13F institutional
ownership quarterly data and following the methodology from Sias (2004), the U.S. economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index from
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), and a vector of financial, economic, and political controls. The financial controls include excess
stock returns on the market portfolio over the quarter, retrieved from Kenneth French’s website, along with average excess returns
over the previous year, and the standard deviation of excess returns over the previous year. Economic controls include the growth
in the industrial production index, growth in personal consumption expenditures on durables, nondurables, and services, growth in
employment, and a dummy variable that takes on one for NBER recessions, all retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
political controls include a set of dummy variables that take on value one for each of the U.S. president’s term-years, and a dummy
variable that takes on value one of the U.S. president is a Democrat. In columns (4) to (6), the specifications also include an interaction
term between the index of economic policy uncertainty and Gallup’s presidential net disapproval ratings (ND), as well as standalone net
disapproval ratings as a control. The herding measure includes stocks with below-median (“Small”) market capitalization in columns
(1) and (4), stocks with above-median (“Big”) market capitalization in columns (2) and (5), and the difference in herding between
small and large stocks in columns (3) and (6). The sample period is from the first quarter of 1985 through the fourth quarter of 2019.
Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent t-stats are in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
Dep. Var.: H5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Small Big S−B Small Big S−B
EPU 0.0016*** 0.0009** 0.0007*** 0.0018*** 0.0010** 0.0008***
3.64 2.09 2.88 3.77 2.25 3.59
EPU x ND 0.0024* 0.0013 0.0011**
1.74 1.11 2.38
Adj. R-squared 0.140 0.205 0.234 0.147 0.207 0.246
Observations 135 135 135 135 135 135
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Table 10. Herding and economic policy uncertainty: Political connections
Time-series regressions of a herding measure (H) over stocks held by at 5 institutional traders, constructed using U.S. 13F institutional
ownership quarterly data and following the methodology from Sias (2004), the U.S. economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index from
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), and a vector of financial, economic, and political controls. The financial controls include excess
stock returns on the market portfolio over the quarter, retrieved from Kenneth French’s website, along with average excess returns
over the previous year, and the standard deviation of excess returns over the previous year. Economic controls include the growth
in the industrial production index, growth in personal consumption expenditures on durables, nondurables, and services, growth in
employment, and a dummy variable that takes on one for NBER recessions, all retrieved from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The
political controls include a set of dummy variables that take on value one for each of the U.S. president’s term-years, and a dummy
variable that takes on value one of the U.S. president is a Democrat. In columns (4) to (6), the specifications also include an interaction
term between the index of economic policy uncertainty and Gallup’s presidential net disapproval ratings (ND), as well as standalone
net disapproval ratings as a control. The herding measure includes stocks from companies whose headquarters are located in states
that exhibit a different political affiliation from the White House (“Unconnected”) in columns (1) and (4), and states aligned with
the political affiliation of the presidency (“Connected”) in columns (2) and (5). In columns (3) and (6), the dependent variable is the
difference in herding between unconnected and connected stocks. The sample period is from the first quarter of 1985 through the fourth
quarter of 2019. Heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent t-stats are in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
Dep. Var.: H5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Unconnected Connected U−C Unconnected Connected U−C
EPU 0.0018*** 0.0013*** 0.0005** 0.0020*** 0.0016*** 0.0004
3.58 2.62 2.09 3.98 2.95 1.55
EPU x ND 0.0022 0.0031** -0.0010**
1.59 2.17 -2.04
Adj. R-squared 0.172 0.126 0.118 0.174 0.137 0.127
Observations 134 135 134 134 135 134
Table 11. Herding and economic policy uncertainty: Presidential affiliation
Time-series regressions of a herding measure (H) over stocks held by at 5 institutional traders, constructed using U.S. 13F institutional
ownership quarterly data and following the methodology from Sias (2004), the U.S. economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index from
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), an interaction term between the economic policy uncertainty index and a dummy variable that takes
on value one if the U.S. president is a Democrat, and a vector of financial, economic, and political controls. The financial controls
include excess stock returns on the market portfolio over the quarter, retrieved from Kenneth French’s website, along with average
excess returns over the previous year, and the standard deviation of excess returns over the previous year. Economic controls include
the growth in the industrial production index, growth in personal consumption expenditures on durables, nondurables, and services,
growth in employment, and a dummy variable that takes on one for NBER recessions, all retrieved from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis. The political controls include a set of dummy variables that take on value one for each of the U.S. president’s term-years, and
the Democrat dummy as a standalone variable. The dependent variable is the difference in herding between below- and above-median
market capitalization in column (1), between politically sensitive and insensitive stocks in column (2), between stocks with an above- and
below-median EPU beta in column (3), and with above- and below-median firm-level political risk in column (4). Politically sensitive
stocks are defined as in Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), and firm-level political risk as in Hassan, Hollander, van Lent, and Tahoun
(2019). The EPU beta is estimated for each stock in the sample through a three-year rolling window controlling for excess returns on
the U.S. stock market portfolio. The sample period starts in the first quarter of 1985 in columns (1) and (2), in the first quarter of
1986 in column (3), and in the second quarter of 2002 in column (4), and ends in the fourth quarter of 2019. Heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent t-stats are in parentheses (* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01).
Dep. Var.: H5 (1) (2) (3) (4)
Size Political Sensitivity EPU Beta Political Risk
EPU 0.0013*** 0.0008* 0.0006*** 0.0013**
3.82 1.95 3.26 2.15
EPU x Democrat -0.0010** -0.0018*** -0.0006** -0.0010*
-2.11 -3.35 -2.36 -1.71
Adj. R-squared 0.257 0.076 0.106 0.045
Observations 135 135 131 67
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